Can ‘New Welfare’ Address Poverty through More and Better Jobs? by Taylor-Gooby, Peter et al.
Journal of Social Policy
http://journals.cambridge.org/JSP
Additional services for Journal of Social Policy:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Can ‘New Welfare’ Address Poverty through More
and Better Jobs?
PETER TAYLOR-GOOBY, JULIA M. GUMY and ADELINE OTTO
Journal of Social Policy / FirstView Article / June 2014, pp 1 - 22
DOI: 10.1017/S0047279414000403, Published online: 17 June 2014
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0047279414000403
How to cite this article:
PETER TAYLOR-GOOBY, JULIA M. GUMY and ADELINE OTTO Can ‘New
Welfare’ Address Poverty through More and Better Jobs? . Journal of Social Policy,
Available on CJO 2014 doi:10.1017/S0047279414000403
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/JSP, IP address: 129.12.29.98 on 20 Jun 2014
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 20 Jun 2014 IP address: 129.12.29.98
Jnl Soc. Pol.: page 1 of 22 © Cambridge University Press 2014
doi:10.1017/S0047279414000403
Can ‘New Welfare’ Address Poverty through
More and Better Jobs?
PETER TAYLOR-GOOBY∗, JULIA M. GUMY∗∗ and ADELINE OTTO∗∗∗
∗SSPSSR, University of Kent, CT2 7NF
email: p.f.taylor-gooby@kent.ac.uk
∗∗School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TZ
email: J.Gumy@kent.ac.uk
∗∗∗SSPSSR, University of Kent, CT2 7NF
email: A.Otto@kent.ac.uk
Abstract
New welfare has been prominent in recent European social policy debates. It involves
mobilising more people into paid work, improving human capital and ensuring fairer access to
opportunities. This programme is attractive to business (more workers, better human capital
and reduced social conflict to enhance productivity and profitability) and to citizens (more
widely accessible job-opportunities with better rewards): a relatively low-cost approach to the
difficulties governments face in maintaining support and meeting social goals as inequalities
widen.
The generalmove towards ‘newwelfare’ gatheredmomentumduring the past twodecades,
given extra impetus by the 2007–09 recession and subsequent stagnation. While employment
rates rose during the prosperous years before the crisis, there was no commensurate reduction
in poverty. Over the same period the share of economic growth returned to labour fell, labour
markets were increasingly de-regulated and inequality increased. This raises the question of
whether new welfare’s economic goals (higher employment, improved human capital) and
social goals (better job quality and incomes) may come into conflict.
This paper examines data for seventeen European countries over the period 2001 to 2007.
It shows that new welfare is much more successful at achieving higher employment than at
reducing poverty, even during prosperity, and that the approach pays insufficient attention to
structural factors, such as the falling wage share, and to institutional issues, such as labour
market deregulation.
The structural context of the shift towards new welfare
A substantial literature in recent years points to the development of new
directions in state welfare, variously termed, the ‘new welfare state’ (Bonoli
and Natali, 2012; Esping-Andersen et al., 2002), ‘social investment’ (Morel
et al., 2012), ‘active social welfare’ (Daguerre, 2007), the ‘Third Way’ (Giddens,
2001), ‘new risk’ welfare (Taylor-Gooby, 2004) and ‘pre-distribution’ (Hacker,
2011). While there are differences in scope and emphasis in the programmes
described (or promoted) by commentators, there is sufficient commonality
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in general direction across states and across regime types to justify grouping
them together under the general heading of the ‘new welfare state’. This is
defined by Bonoli and Natali as ‘an institution that puts the emphasis less on
income replacement and more on the promotion of labour market participation
through activation and investment in human capital’ (Bonoli and Natali,
2009: 8).
Welfare states have always pursued diverse objectives: at the political level,
balancing the potential conflicts inherent in democratic capitalist societies (Offe,
1984; O’Connor, 1984); at the economic level, helping to ensure national growth
and competitiveness and maintain stability (Pierson, 2001); and, at the social
level, managing social needs and problems. Policies to achieve these objectives
must address a number of tensions: at the political level between the interests
of capital and labour or business and workers (Gough, 1976), at the economic
level between equality and efficiency (Okun, 1975) or growth, employment and
equality (Iversen and Wren, 1998) and at the social level between the mass of the
population and the more marginal groups (immigrants, the disreputable poor,
long-term unemployed people (Van Oorschot, 2006; Korpi and Palme, 2003) –
and, perhaps, between young and old).
During much of the post-war period, welfare states addressed these issues
through a variety of interventions within a broadly Keynesian economic policy
framework. The main policy directions were, at the political level, expanding
popular social programmes as growth allowed; at the economic level, supporting
private sector investment, managing employment, education and training
and implementing counter-cyclical interventions; at the social level, running
horizontally redistributive mass health care, pension and benefit programmes
and vertically redistributive welfare programmes to address poverty (Flora, 1986).
The context of the post-war settlement has shifted in response to changes
at three levels: the transition to more globalised and post-industrial societies
and financialised economies; a concomitant decline in the proportion of gross
domestic product (GDP) returned to labour, togetherwith disappointing poverty
outcomes and growing inequality; and political shifts that promote the adoption
of new welfare as a policy framework.
Globalisation and post-industrialism
As discussed extensively elsewhere (for a magisterial review, see Pierson,
2001), the various changes in the transition to a more globalised, financialised
and post-industrial society have fragmented the political forces sustaining the
previous welfare settlement, constrained the abilities of governments to pursue
directly interventionist economic management (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000;
Jessop, 2002) and led to substantial deregulation of labour markets (Standing,
2009). So far as the individual citizens of welfare states are concerned, they
have created a range of new social needs and risks in relation to changes in
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TABLE 1. At risk of poverty 2001–2011, selected EU countries
(Eurostat)
Before transfers After transfers
2001 2007 2011 2001 2007 2011
Germany 21 24.8 25.1 11 15.2 15.8
Spain 23 23.9 29.8 19 19.7 21.8
France 26 26.4 24.7 13 13.1 14.0
Italy 22 24.1 24.4 19 19.8 19.6
Poland 31 26.5 24.1 16 17.3 17.7
Sweden 17 27.5 27.9 9 10.5 14.0
UK 28 29.7 30.5 18 18.6 16.2
Note: 60%median income threshold; data for equivalised persons; total population.
family life (Lewis, 2010) and working life (Emmenegger, 2012). These needs are
variously discussed (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Esping-Andersen et al., 2002), but
most accounts of new social risks include three broad areas:
• gender-related needs for child and elder care, family-friendly work-practices
and clear sex discrimination policies as more women and mothers move into
full-time paid work;
• employment-related needs for training, better access to jobs (especially for
lower-skilled people) and greater security in work as labour markets become
more flexible (Emmenegger, 2012; Hemerijck, 2013);
• poverty-related needs, as the trend to greater inequality in market incomes
(Atkinson, 2007) generates concern about junk jobs (Esping-Andersen, 2002)
and pay levels inadequate to support decent family life (Standing, 2011).
However, these risks need to be set in the context of the broader politico-
economic and social changes identified above. It is now harder for governments
to tackle them through traditional post-Keynesian interventions. In any case,
the social institutions that mediate the relationship between capital and labour
(trade unions and the labour movement) have grown weaker as the result of
labour market deregulation and the shift towards labour relations characterised
by the service rather than the manufacturing sector.
Inequalities, poverty and the declining return to labour
Table 1 gives Eurostat data on at risk of poverty rates for the six largest
EU members and for Sweden. Poverty is measured as bottom-end inequality
in terms of incomes, before social transfers apart from pensions, in order to
focus on the market income effects that new welfare seeks to address. Poverty
rose in all countries during the period (except the rather less post-industrial
and financialised Poland on the pre-transfer measure). This increase largely
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took place in the economically benign climate of the early 2000s, when all the
countries mentioned enjoyed consistent growth, but typically continued after
the 2007 crisis. Welfare state transfers sharply reduced the impact of inadequate
market incomes but failed to compensate adequately for the increase even during
the good times. Atkinson’s longer time series from 1980 to 2005 shows how this
follows a pattern of growing inequality in market incomes across most western
economies (particularly marked in Anglo-Saxon countries but also including
Corporatist economies such as Germany, where 90th percentile incomes rose
twice as fast as those at the 10th percentile, and social-democratic Sweden, where
the relative increase was about one-and-a-third times: Atkinson, 2007). These
trends and the limited success of EU policies in mitigating them are discussed
elsewhere (see Cantillon, 2011).
Disappointing (relative) poverty and inequality trends might not matter
so much, since real growth up to 2007 increased available resources. However,
there is an established longer-term trend for a greater proportion of GDP to
flow to capital and less to labour. The political economy approach interprets
this as evidence of a shift in the balance of forces between capital and labour
in a post-industrial and more globalised and competitive world (Rodrik, 1997).
Neo-classical models, based on analysis of international competition (Stolper
and Samuelson, 1941), place more stress on the mobility and relative abundance
of capital and labour in more- and less-developed countries.
Bailey and colleagues (Bailey et al., 2011) use OECD data to calculate
the proportion of gross value added in the economy returned to labour in
the form of wages and employment benefits in a range of countries. They
show that the return to labour has fallen, most strikingly in the Anglo-Saxon
economies and less dramatically in Corporatist economies, with a mixed pattern
in Social Democratic countries (Table 2; see also ILO, 2013: 19). The analysis also
examines distributional issues and follows the predictions of globalisation and
post-industrial theories in showing that the declining wage-share is particularly
marked among lower-income groups. Labour market deregulation reinforces
these trends.
The politics of new welfare
Welfare states face simultaneous pressures for retrenchment to enhance
competitiveness and for expansion tomeet social risks and the needs of an ageing
population (Palier, 2010). Much discussion of the politics of new welfare focuses
on the tactics used by governments to manage these pressures rather than the
structural context of the falling wage share, growing inequality and deregulation
in which they emerge. Pierson’s influential discussion of political responses to
new risk pressures at the end of the twentieth century stressed cost-containment,
re-commodification and recalibration (Pierson, 2001: 422). He identified three
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 20 Jun 2014 IP address: 129.12.29.98
can ‘new welfare’ deliver more and better jobs? 5
TABLE 2. Trends in wages as a proportion of
national income, selected countries
Total wages as % GVA
1970 2007 % change
US 57 49 −7.4
Australia 46 39 −7.6
Canada 55 48 −6.8
France 43 42 −0.5
UK 59 50 −9.2
Germany 50 45 −5.7
Japan 46 44 −2.4
Finland 49 45 −3.6
Denmark 56 60 +4.3
Sweden 48 46 −1.3
Source: Calculated from Bailey et al., 2011, Table 4.
main methods used by governments to limit the damage to electoral support
from retrenchment: compensation, obfuscation through complex changes to
entitlement rules and division of the constituencies which support particular
areas, for example pension reforms which defer cuts so they affect younger but
not older age-groups.
Bonoli and Natali (2012) point out that Pierson’s emphasis on blame
avoidance needs to be complemented by attention to the opportunities for
‘affordable credit-claiming’ which newwelfare allows. Newwelfare states identify
areas in which programmes can be expanded at relatively modest cost (day
and elder care, training and work programmes; regulations improving family-
friendly working; non-discrimination and human rights legislation) for which
credit can be claimed from new risk groups. These new areas allow opportunities
to gain support, particularly from younger voters most affected by new risks,
and offer a basis for consensus-forming, political compromise and political
exchange.
New welfare policies typically allow some retrenchment of established
old social risk programmes but expand new risk provision, for example the
combination of support programmes which help disabled people into paid work
and better,more targeted benefits for thosewho remain unable towork. Similarly,
more accessible childcare may be coupled with benefit cuts for single parents.
Such compromises are more viable where left and centre parties, and unions
defending the welfare state, include both younger groups with daycare and work-
related needs and workers in traditional industries (Bonoli and Natali, 2012:
chapter 13).
Since 2007, recession, followed by stagnation across most of Europe, has
imposed further demands on competitiveness, legitimacy and public spending
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(Farnsworthand Irving, 2011;Hemmerijk, 2012). Ingeneral, centre-left supporters
of state welfare have lost political power as the crisis continues, intensifying the
search for attractive new welfare programmes (Barnes and Hicks, 2013).
The new welfare state emphasises social investment, activation and fairer
access to opportunities. The intention is that social policies should prioritise
helping people get decent market incomes, since raising taxes to finance benefits
may damage national competitiveness and perhaps electoral popularity. Hacker’s
argument that public policy should put greater emphasis on ‘pre-distribution’
(policies to ensure adequate working-class pay in the first place) and less on ‘re-
distribution’ has substantial resonance (Hacker, 2011). However, most advocates
do not argue that new welfare should displace the more established tax-and-
spend approaches (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011: 458; Esping-Andersen
et al., 2002) but should complement them. Spending on cash benefits for these
groups has not fallen in recent years (taking into account the economic cycle)
but replacement rates have, as market incomes grow more unequal. This is of
particular concern at a time of economic and social uncertainty, when social
risks related to life-course or labour market transitions are less predictable and
insurable than previously.
The practical assessment of new welfare programmes is complicated by
the variety of policies pursued within different contexts, and by problems in
assembling good quality comparative evidence. There is considerable dispute
about the effectiveness of existing policies in EU countries in mitigating
disappointing poverty trends, and their potential to do so as economies recover
(Cantillon, 2011; Cantillon and Van Lancker, 2013; Vaalavuo, 2013; Pintelon et al.,
2013; Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck, 2012; Vandenbroucke et al., 2011; Bonoli
and Natali, 2012: 302).
The track record of the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon
2000 Open Method of Co-ordination programme in relation to poverty is not
impressive (Kok, 2004). Policies intended to expand the workforce appear to
have been more successful, especially in relation to women. Female employment
rates in European countries rose by between a quarter and a third from the
1960s to 2007 (Bonoli and Natali, 2012: 115). Further improvement to a rate
of 75 per cent of twenty to sixty-four year-olds is the first stated target of the
current Europe 2020 programme (EC, 2013a). There is considerable evidence that
education interventions, particularly those at an early age, improve outcomes
(Esping-Anderson, 2004), and indications that training programmes generate
higher employment rates, especially in high-quality jobs in knowledge-based
industries (Nelson and Stephens, 2012). The egalitarian Nordic welfare states
spend relatively more on services. This fact is often used to reinforce the
argument that governments should expand services such as child and social
care, education and active labour market (ALMP) programmes, rather than
compensating low incomes through benefits. The corresponding point that
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these countries score well in quality of employment protection is less often
noted.
Social investment is variously interpreted (Jenson, 2012: 41; Pintelon et al.,
2013: 52), with all approaches sharing a distinctive emphasis on the ‘productive
functions of social policy’ (Nyga˚rd and Kru¨ger, 2012; Morel et al., 2012;
Vandenbroucke et al., 2011; De Deken, 2012). Early and continuing investment
in human capital is seen as crucial to enable people to grasp opportunities in a
knowledge society and to adapt to changes in demand for different skills (Nolan,
2013; Jenson, 2009).
Some commentators argue that middle-class groups are typically better able
to exploit opportunities and use common services through superior access to
resources and their social skills (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987; Titmuss, 1976).
Expansion of services such as childcaremay attractmiddle-class electoral support
but fail to reduce inequalities unless targeted. A strict investment logic will
prioritise growth over the current consumption provided through many welfare
state services (Nolan, 2013: 463). For example, human capital investmentmay not
direct resources to themost needybecause abetter return is available from those at
a somewhat higher level of achievement (BIS, 2012). One response by proponents
of social investment is to expand the concept to include a range of services beyond
those on which immediate returns can be expected to generate broader social
gains over an extended period. In addition to childcare and training, an extended
social investment programmemay include better housing and social provision to
improve public health, more general educational spending to create a ‘learning
society’ and policies to reduce inequalities and advance social cohesion (Jenson,
2012: 41).
Work-centred new welfare has been increasingly prominent in the policy
debate to address problems of economic competitiveness and working-age
poverty. The OECD’s ‘Jobs Strategies’ from 1985 to 2007 argued for stronger
incentives, a lower tax wedge and deregulation to improve labour market
flexibility (2011: 40–1). These themes are reinforced in the EU’s initial 2000 Lisbon
Strategy with its commitment that Europe should ‘become the most competitive
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. More
recently, the Europe 2020 Strategy with its goals of ‘smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth’, in which ‘better educational levels help employability and
progress in increasing the employment rate helps to reduce poverty’, builds on
this approach (EC, 2010). Early investment in skills in addition to spending on
effective and efficient social protection is central to the strategy (EC, 2013, 2014).
More and better jobs
At the level of individual needs, new welfare programmes link together
two main areas to do with quantity and quality of work. The first includes
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Figure 1. Family spending (benefits, services and tax breaks) 2003–2009 OECD
various programmes intended to address gender and employment-related needs
by increasing the proportion of the population in paidwork. Thismay be pursued
through the provision of childcare and elder care, to enable those with family
responsibilities to direct more time and energy to work, coupled with greater
parents’ rights and working practices that are more family-friendly. Family-
related spending generally has continued to increase across Europe in the 2000s
and accounts for an average of about 2.5 per cent of GDP (Figure 1). In addition,
governments have developed a wide range of ALMP programmes, including
job creation, supported employment for marginal groups, work incentives, job
sharing, early retirement and training. These occupy fewer resources than gender-
related mobilisation programmes, have generally expanded and been most
vigorously pursued in Nordic and Continental Corporatist countries (Figure 2).
The second area covers policies intended to improve the quality of (and
reward from) work. These include better education and training, intended to
both raise productivity and to help people command employment that is more
secure, of higher quality and more knowledge intensive. In relation to labour
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Figure 2. ALMP spending (job creation, training, insertion etc.) 2003–2009 OECD
Figure 3. (Colour online) Employment Protection Index scores, formal labour market: OECD
1990–2008
market regulation, there has been a shift away from collective rights in areas such
as strike action or regulation of dismissal and working hours towards individual
rights concerned with opportunities and discrimination on grounds of gender,
ethnicity, faith, sexuality and age. Contractual rights have grown somewhat
weaker in Europe since 1990, but with the weakest performers converging
upwards towards the highest-scoring Nordic, Corporatist and Mediterranean
countries (uncounted informal employment may distort statistics for the last
group: Figure 3).
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Different aspects of newwelfare have been emphasised in different countries.
Obinger and colleagues sum up these directions in policy and relate them to
regime type (Obinger et al., in Emmenegger, 2011). They distinguish:
• Liberal approaches which combine low social and employment protection but
pursue ‘make work pay’ workfare programmes to increase employment. Here
‘newwelfare’ stresses opportunities and incentives as in theUKUniversalCredit
reforms and Work Programme.
• Dualisation, most common in continental and southern Europe, which
provides good protection for labour market insiders, but not for outsiders,
who are subject to a more liberal regime, for example the development of
part-time ‘mini-jobs’ from 2003 in Germany with limited protection.
• The Nordic tradition of encompassing security, with high protection levels for
all and high-quality training and support into work, demonstrated in the high
spending on activation.
• Flexi-curity systems in modernised welfare states, which link high levels of
social protection with low employment protection and pursue investment in
human capital, for example part-time working in the Netherlands.
All except the liberal approach include active support into paid work and
training, but job quality is only a feature of the dualised regime (and then only
for insiders) and the encompassing welfare regime. Otherwise the approach to
social cohesion is through acceptance of market outcomes (liberalisation) or
compensation for their deficiencies (flexi-curity). This reinforces the evidence
that the emphasis in new welfare has been on the mobilisation of workers rather
than the quality of jobs. It also indicates that new welfare and social investment
policies differ in relation to institutional, socio-economic, political and cultural
context (Fenger and Ellison, 2013).
New welfare state programmes are attractive because they address the
practical problems of meeting need that are the immediate business of
welfare states without damaging national competitiveness under the altered
circumstances of post-industrial societies. In addition, they promise to do
so in ways that gain electoral support and legitimacy (through improved
opportunities) without damaging economic goals. One aspect is the shift from
direct commitment to address poverty ex post facto through tax-financed transfer
payments to policies intended to improve access to market incomes in the first
place. This shifts responsibility for final outcomes (Cantillon and Van Lancker,
2013) away from government and towards the individual, who must grasp
opportunities for training and gaining a job which meets their needs. Market
outcomes are arbitrary (like the weather: von Hayek, 1944). The category of just
or unjust does not apply to them. However, under a developed new welfare
system, market experience is increasingly moralised. The shift of responsibility
may help reconcile demands for fairness with obvious market inequalities.
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New welfare in practice
To sum up the argument so far, economic, social and political changes, to do
with the shift to more post-industrial, globalised and financialised societies, have
put pressures on welfare states. The key changes as they affect individuals are:
disappointing poverty trends and greater inequality, the emergence of new social
risks and the weakening of the political forces and institutional factors which
sustained the previous redistributive settlement. One result has been the devel-
opment of a new social investment or activation approach to welfare. In practice,
this is designed to increase employment rates and also the quality of and returns
from work. The social policies of new welfare are about more and better jobs.
If new welfare is to deliver both social and economic benefits and to help
manage the big trade-off between economic efficiency and equality, the policies
must generate better quality and better rewarded work at the bottom end as well
as supplying more and perhaps better-trained workers to business. A structural
analysis would emphasise the underlying conflict of interests between capital and
labour, the overall shifts inwage share and income inequality and thederegulation
of employment. Individual level analyses focus on the needs experienced by
particular and often fragmented social groups. From the first perspective, the risk
that growth may not benefit the poor is pressing. Governments facing demands
from different groups in the electorate tend to adopt the second. They may
seek policy trade-offs that provide opportunities for credit-claiming but are not
primarily directed at improving bottom-end incomes. The politics of newwelfare
often focuses onmicro-politics, the detail of the compromises and exchanges that
policies exploit, rather than the changing macro-level context which influences
the bargaining power of different groups and the resources available to them.
We develop the argument through exploratory analysis of empirical data on
new welfare in institutional context.
Analysis: data and methods
The above discussion raises three questions:
• To what extent are ‘new welfare’ policies successful in improving employment?
• To what extent do they help reduce poverty?
• What is the contribution of the institutional factors (contractual rights,
employment protection, trade union influence) that the new welfare analysis
downplays, alongside the family-friendly working, labour market activation,
human capital improvements and anti-discrimination measures that it
commends?
To examine these questions data were drawn from the OECD’s Socx and
other databases, Eurostat and the CIRI Human Rights index (for details see the
Appendix). These include:
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• For labour mobilisation policies: spending on parental leave and the training
element in ALMP. Parental leave is preferred to daycare spending as a measure
of support for family-friendly working since daycare includes care for older
and disabled people, which may be concerned to enhance their capacity to
live independent lives rather than permit parents and carers to take paid jobs.
OECD’s ALMP spending measure includes a wide range of policies, some of
which (for example, early retirement) are not typically seen as part of new
welfare and which may not enhance employment. The training component is
directed both at helping lower-skilled people into work and at improving the
productive capacity of those on low wages.
• For human capital improvement policies: participation in lifelong learning
for people of core working age (twenty-five to forty-nine). This is preferred
to measures of general educational participation or spending since education
policy includes a wide range of activities that may not improve employability
and because lifelong learning is a common objective of new welfare and social
investment and is a core component in ‘ET2020’, the Education and Training
DG’s contribution to Europe 2020 (EC, 2013b).
• For non-discrimination policies: the human rights and women’s economic
rights indices developed by the CIRI institute. Human rights provide a general
measure of legislation to counter discrimination across a number of political,
economic and social areas. Women’s economic rights include the benefit and
employment rights, notably equal pay intended to improveworking conditions
and reward and encourage more women to take paid work.
• For institutional factors bearing on job quality: the OECD employment
protection index (version I) and union membership; the former measuring
contractual rights in relation to employment and dismissal, the latter
institutional bargaining power.
Policy outcomes are measured as follows:
• The employment rate is simply the proportion of the population aged sixteen
to sixty-four in civilian employment, from OECD data.
• Poverty is measured using Eurostat data on the proportion of the population
falling below a 60 per cent poverty line before transfers (apart from pensions).
Incomes before transfers reflect the new welfare objective of improving market
incomes, especially at the bottom, rather than relying on tax-and-spend. The
variable includes non-workers as well as those in work so that the impact on
the whole population can be studied.
Five difficulties limit the scopeof the research and ensure that the conclusions
are at a general level:
Firstly, adequate data are only available for the relatively recent past and
for seventeen European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
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Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway (not
EU), Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. This gives a good coverage of different
varieties of European welfare states, apart from CEE members.
Secondly, any analysis must take into account the economic cycle, which has
strong effects on poverty and employment. The analysis focuses on the period
between 2001 and 2007, one of the strongest and most consistent periods of
stability, expansion and rising employment in the countries considered. The
severe banking crisis of 2007–08 and the consequent recession and the recovery
programmes had major impacts on policy, including a massive expansion
in spending on unemployed and low-paid people via ‘automatic regulators’,
exceptional measures to sustain employment, retrenchment on a scale not seen
since the 1920s and 1930s in some countries and many policy innovations. For
these reasons, developments beyond 2007 are excluded.
Thirdly, the relatively small number of countries and of data-points (17 ×
7 = 119) is a severe constraint on analysis. As a result, data are pooled across all
countries and years considered, so that the impact of the different national policy
emphases discussed above is not explored. This is justified in a broad brush
analysis over a period in which economic indicators are broadly consistent,
limiting national variation. The analysis only supports broad generalisations
about the impact of new welfare policies as a whole across European countries in
a period of growth, and is presented as such.
Fourthly, the complexity of the interactions between the various policy areas
imposes limitations on multivariate analysis. New welfare programmes are often
pursued as a package, and education spending, lifelong learning, training and
other human capital investments are typically highly correlated as are human
and gender rights policies. These problems were addressed by choosing specific
variables to represent particular aspects of the programmes.
Fifthly, the data include private spending but may under-report training,
lifelong learning or parental leave based on collective agreements.
We first conducted exploratory correlational analyses to examine the
relationship between each of the welfare variables and the employment and
poverty rates. Secondly, a Prais Winsten regression model with Panel Corrected
Standard Errors (PCSE) was estimated on a balanced panel. This model was
chosen to overcome the limitations of traditional OLS models for the estimation
of time-series cross-section data, which include panel heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation of errors (Beck and Katz, 1995, 2004). To deal with serial
correlation of errors an autocorrelation parameter (AR1) was included in the
model. This was preferred to the incorporation of a lagged dependent variable as
predictor, as the lagged dependent variablemay obscure the relationship between
the substantive independent variables and the dependent variable (Achen, 2000;
Beck and Katz, 2004; Plumper et al., 2005). Fixed effects (country dummies) were
not included since, given the small time period considered (T= 7), to do sowould
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TABLE 3. Employment rates, poverty and new welfare
policies, 2001–07 (Pearson correlations)
Employment Poverty
Employment
Parental leave 0.44∗∗∗ 0.08
ALMP − 0.10 0.34∗∗
Human capital
Lifelong learning 0.42∗∗∗ 0.14
Non-discrimination
Human rights index 0.42∗∗∗ 0.22∗
Women’s economic rights index 0.08 0.18ˆ
Labour market institutions
Contractual rights − 0.16 − 0.41∗∗∗
Union membership 0.38∗∗∗ 0.16
Employment ratio − 0.14
Notes: N = 119.
ˆ p< 0.06; ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01; ∗∗∗p< 0.001.
reduce degrees of freedom and eliminate variance (Beck, 2001). All independent
variables were lagged one year to allow for time effects of the policies on both
the employment and poverty rates. Given that the data were collected at different
time points each year, lagging was also performed to ensure the correct temporal
sequence of cause and effect and, therefore, to avoid reverse causality. A sensitivity
analysis examining immediate effects produced similar relationships to the ones
found with the PCSE model.
New welfare, employment and poverty
The analysis first examined correlations between relevant policies and
outcomes (Table 3). Family-friendly working, participation in lifelong learning,
better human rights and union density had a moderate and positive effect on
employment. For contractual rights, the effect is negative and not significant.
Women’s economic rights have no independent effect beyond family-friendly
working, nor does activation spending.
The impact of parental leave, of lifelong learning and union density is as
expected. Better human rights may help people into work, but equally may be a
feature of societies which also have higher employment. The weak negative effect
of contractual rights may be because such rights make employers unwilling to
engage staff who are more difficult to dismiss. The impact of women’s economic
rights is positive but weak and not significant: such rightsmay improve standards
in employment but not greatly expand the labour force.
Column one in Table 3 shows that many core new welfare policies appear,
prima facie, to have achieved their first objective, higher employment rates, at
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least in the prosperous years of the early twenty-first century, although they do
not obviously improve contractual rights or women’s economic rights.
The second column of Table 3 gives the correlations with poverty rates.
Interestingly, the spending on ALMP training and, more weakly, human rights
and women’s economic rights are associated with higher levels of poverty,
although in the case of women’s economic rights the association is marginally
significant. One explanation of the link between stronger human and women’s
economic rights and higher poverty is that these programmes do not necessarily
help those at the bottommost. Instead it is groupswhose incomes are above those
of the poorest who make best use of these opportunities, so that the gap between
those in themiddle and those at thebottomstretches out. Employmentprotection
is strongly linked to lower poverty. Conversely, family-friendly working, lifelong
learning and union density do not seem to reduce poverty.
Columns one and two scores for most variables differ substantially.
Parental leave spending, lifelong learning and union density score positively for
employment but are not significant for poverty. The logic of new welfare is that
its policies reconcile the economic goal of higher employment and the social goal
of greater social inclusion. In fact, the only policy which appears to be successful
in reducing poverty is the stronger guarantee of contractual rights measured
by employment protection, not typically part of the new welfare package. This
variable has a weaker and negative effect on employment. The suggestion is that
new welfare is more effective in increasing employment than in cutting poverty.
Higher employment is itself associated with lower poverty but the effect is not
significant.
Table 4 shows the relationship between the various policies and institutional
factors and employment rates. Sensitivity analyses indicate that the inclusion of
the AR1 variable in the model is responsible for the very high R-squared of 0.94
(see Beck and Katz, 2004: 17. If the AR1 variable is removed and the dependent
variable lagged, explanatory power remains satisfactory at 0.90. Statistically
significant coefficients are in bold. Themodel statistics confirm the findings from
Table 3: across this group of countries and time-period, parental leave, lifelong
learning, contractual rights and union membership enhance employment. The
multivariate model brings out the statistical significance of contractual and
women’s economic rights. Themodel also highlights the negative and statistically
significant impact of ALMP on employment.
Table 5 examines the impact of new welfare policies on poverty. Two models
are presented to address the argument that new welfare policies may reduce
poverty through their employment effect, by helping low-income people move
from benefits into work or to better paid jobs. InModel 1 the effects of the welfare
variables on poverty are estimated. Model 2 includes employment rates (lagged
one year). R-squared statistics for both models are satisfactory, at 0.88. In both
models, ALMP training and human rights are associated with higher poverty;
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TABLE 4. New welfare policies, institutions and
employment rates, Prais Winsten regression with Panel




Parental leave (t–1) 5.22 (2.37)∗
ALMP (t–1) − 3.66 (0.92)∗∗∗
Human capital
Lifelong learning (t–1) 0.28 (0.08)∗∗
Non-discrimination
Human rights index (t–1) 0.32 (0.23)
Women’s economic rights index (t–1) − 0.55 (0.24)∗
Labour market institutions
Contractual rights (t–1) 1.99 (0.62)∗∗
Union Membership (t–1) 0.08 (0.03)∗∗
N 118
Wald χ2 (df) 95.42 (7)∗∗∗
Rho 0.8268
R2 0.9356
Notes: Prais Winsten regression with AR1 autocorrelation
parameter and panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). Model
estimated with Stata SE 11.1 with xtpcse command with AR1
option.
∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01; ∗∗∗p< 0.001.
both contractual rights and, more weakly, lifelong learning reduce poverty. An
increase in employment is also found to reducepoverty, yet byavery small amount
(β = – 0.05, p< 0.01) (Model 2). This confirms the negative andweak correlation
found in Table 3 (r = –0.14, p> 0.05). The positive effects of ALMP and the
negative effect of contractual rights are similar to those in Table 3, while lifelong
learning and employment now become statistically significant. The relationship
with contractual rights is the strongest andmost highly significant in themodels.
One explanation of why such rights reduce poverty while union membership
plays a limited role is that they apply across the labour market, while unions may
deploy defensive strength in the interests of particular groups, especially in the
more dualised economies. Parental leave, which increases employment, reduces
poverty, but the effect is not significant.
These findings generally support the view that the new welfare objective of
mobilising more people into paid work can conflict with that of increasing social
inclusion and cutting poverty. Family-friendly working and lifelong learning
improve employment, as expected. However policies which are not typically
associated with new welfare such as stronger contractual rights and union
membership appearmore effective, and the newwelfare policy direction of active
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TABLE 5. New welfare policies, institutions and poverty, Prais Winsten
regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), 2001–2007
Model 1 Model 2
β PCSE β PCSE
Constant 29.53 (2.96)∗∗∗ 32.20 (3.32)∗∗∗
Employment
Parental leave (t–1) − 0.67 (2.10) − 0.33 (2.11)
ALMP (t–1) 2.93 (0.35)∗∗∗ 2.74 (0.32)∗∗∗
Human capital
Lifelong learning (t–1) − 0.10 (0.04)∗ − 0.09 (0.04)∗
Non-discrimination
Human rights index (t–1) 0.25 (0.12)∗ 0.30 (0.12)∗
Women’s economic rights index (t–1) 0.26 (0.36) 0.26 (0.37)
Labour market institutions
Contractual rights (t–1) − 3.38 (0.73)∗∗∗ − 3.39 (0.67)∗∗∗
Union Membership (t–1) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Employment ratio (t–1) − 0.05 (0.02)∗∗
N 118 118
Wald χ2 (df) 117.89 (7)∗∗∗ 156.81 (8)∗∗∗
Rho 0.7287 0.6884
R2 0.8826 0.8757
Notes: Prais Winsten regression with AR1 autocorrelation parameter and panel corrected





p< 0.01; ∗∗∗p< 0.001.
labour market spending, especially on training, seems to reduce employment.
In relation to the parallel objective of reducing poverty, lifelong learning has
an effect, but contractual rights are much more powerful. Active labour market
policies perversely seem to increase poverty, as do human rights. The fact that
higher employment is weakly associated with lower poverty lends some limited
support to the new welfare logic in this area. In general, the analysis supports the
argument that the new welfare package is more successful in mobilising people
into paid work than in addressing poverty. It also indicates that, while some
new welfare programmes contribute to a reduction in poverty, it is institutional
factors, such as contractual rights, which play the strongest role.
Conclusion
This article discusses the emergence of the family of policies sometimes described
as ‘new welfare’ alongside traditional social contribution and tax-and-spend ‘old
welfare’ during the past two decades. New welfare programmes have in common
that they seek to improve employment rates and the productiveness of labour
and to reduce poverty, thereby addressing both economic and social goals. They
are attractive to business, because they offer an expanded andmore highly skilled
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and productive labour force, to governments because they are cheaper than
tax-and-spend and less likely to involve unpopular tax increases or jeopardise
international competitiveness through higher borrowing and labour costs, and
to voters because they promise better working conditions and opportunities and
are seen as fairly rewarding individual effort. Because they include a number
of different policy directions, they are amenable to the kind of compensatory
political strategies analysed by Bonoli and Natali (2012).
Moves in these directions may help moderate an endemic conflict within
western welfare states, reconciling the pressures for inequality that stem from
capitalism operating across a global market with the demands for social progress
associated with democracy. One risk is that programmes to mobilise and upskill
the labour forcemay conflict with programmes to improve job quality and spread
opportunities because they serve different interests.
An analysis of the impact of new welfare on employment rates and poverty,
by market income measures in seventeen European countries during the years of
confident prosperity (2001 to 2007), brings out these conflicts. The findings
are limited by the available data and can only support the most general
conclusions. They indicate that many new welfare policies are associated with
higher employment, but that some (notably ALMP training) are also linked to
higher poverty. Lifelong learning, however, both raises employment and reduces
poverty. Higher employment in itself appears to have a limited impact on poverty
outcomes, despite claims that more jobs are the best route to social inclusion.
Other policies which are not typically part of the new welfare package, most
notably stricter labour market regulations, have a stronger and independent
effect in mitigating poverty, as is also shown in the OECD analysis (2011: 31).
These findings point to three conclusions. First, new welfare programmes
have varied and complex effects and advantage some groups more than others.
This reinforces Bonoli and Natali’s analysis (2012) of the politics of new welfare
as a domain of interaction, compromise and exchange between different interest
groups. Secondly, if policy-makers are to lay equal stress on achieving social
as well as the economic goals, there is a strong case for linking new welfare
programmes to regulatory interventions, such as employment protection, and
to stronger contractual rights across the board. These might help ensure that
benefits flow to the weakest as well as the most productive groups in the labour
force. Thirdly, the new welfare approach is based on a limited analysis of political
forces in post-industrial globalised welfare states. This operates at an individual
and micro-political rather than a macro level. It pays little attention to structural
factors, such as the falling wage share and labourmarket deregulation and puts at
the centre of its analysis the opportunities open to individuals and their capacity
to grasp them. It downplays the enhanced structural power of capital in a more
globalised world and the importance of corresponding action to strengthen the
defensive capacity of labour.
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Parental leave Public/private mandatory spend on





Public/private mandatory spend on
ALMP % GDP (OECD)
0.78 0.43
Human capital




Human rights index Additive index scored 1 to 14, reflecting
individuals’ freedom of movement,
speech, assembly, and association, and
workers’ rights, electoral





Additive index scored 0–3 reflecting
women’s equal employment rights, job
security and pay differential (CIRI)
2.16 0.47
Labour market institutions
Contractual rights Employment Protection Index version II
(OECD)
2.64 0.52




Social inclusion Poverty before tax and transfers, 60%
median (Eurostat)
25.56 3.45
Higher employment ratio Civilian employment % of pop 15–64
(OECD)
70.45 9.82
Note: Missing data interpolated. The data are mainly derived from CPDS 1 (Klaus et al., 2012)
and the non-discrimination indices from CIRI (Cingranelli et al., 2013).
